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NOTES
LABOR ARBITRATION AND STATE
WRONGFUL DISCHARGE
ACTIONS: DUE PROCESS OR
REMEDIAL DOUBLE DIPPING?
Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The filing of a wrongful discharge action in state court by an employee
covered under a collective bargaining agreement creates a conflict between
two well-established legal principles. One principle is the concept of federal
preemption. Under the constitutional doctrine of federal preemption, if a
state law and a federal statute come into conflict, federal law prevails.2 On
the other side is the constitutional concept of "Our Federalism." Under the
federalism doctrine, each state should be allowed to govern itself according
to the desire of the majority of its citizens. Doctrinal tension develops
when a union employee covered by a collective bargaining agreement
submits a grievance for unjust discharge to an arbitration board and
additionally files suit in state court pursuant to a state statute for wrongful
discharge. Which policy should prevail? Should federal law preempt state
law or should the state be allowed to adopt legislation which provides
remedies for workers discharged in contravention of state public policy?
The entire judicial system has wrestled with this classic constitutional
conflict for nearly three decades. What was originally a consistent line of
cases holding state claims were preempted by federal law has gradually been
transformed into a patchwork of federal court decisions holding state court
actions to be valid.3 The United States Supreme Court recently reconciled
this disparity in interpretation with its decision in Lingle v. Norge Division
of Magic Chef, Inc.4 The Supreme Court held that a union employee's claim
for wrongful discharge will not be preempted as long as the state action
does not require the interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement.'
1. 108 S. Ct. 1877 (1988).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 20-24.
3. See infra notes 41 through 128 and accompanying text.
4. 108 S. Ct. at 1877.
5. Id at 1878.
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This note will explore the history of Section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act 6 (LMRA) and the preemption doctrine, the
development of the wrongful discharge action, the case history involving
union employees filing state actions for wrongful discharge, and the effect
the Lingle decision will have on business, the judicial system and, most
importantly, the bodypolitic of the individual states. Emphasis will be
placed on the important role the state legislature will play in determining
the exact ramifications of the Supreme Court's decision. Finally, the note
will outline and discuss four main options state legislatures have when
considering whether to expand upon the Supreme Court's decision or to
circumvent the potential for remedial "double dipping."
II. THE DECISION
The plaintiff, Lingle, an employee of the defendant corporation, was
covered by a collective bargaining agreement negotiated by her union. The
agreement contained a "just cause" provision.7 In December of 1984, Lingle
was discharged from her duties on the grounds that she had filed a false
workers compensation claim under the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act.8
Lingle's union filed a grievance which was finally submitted to arbitration
pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement.9 The arbitration board
ruled in favor of Lingle and ordered reinstatement with back pay.10
In the summer of 1985, Lingle filed a wrongful discharge action in the
Williamson County, Illinois, circuit court.11 Magic Chef removed the case
to the Federal District Court for the Southern District of Illinois on
diversity of citizenship. Magic Chef further moved to dismiss the action for
lack of jurisdiction, arguing the claim was preempted by Section 301 of the
LMRA.12 The district court granted Magic Chefs motion to dismiss and
stated that, "[a]llowing an independent tort action for retaliatory discharge
6. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982).
7. Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 823 F.2d 1031, 1033 n.2 (7th Cir. 1987),
aft4 108 S. Ct. 1877 (1988). Article 26.2 of plaintiff's collective bargaining agreement read in
part as follows: "[Tihe right of the employer to discharge or suspend an employee for just cause
is recognized." Id at 1033.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1034. Article 8.5 required mandatory arbitration and included grievance
procedures which were included to be the exclusive remedy for all disputes. Id
10. Lingle, 108 S. Ct. at 1879.
11. Id.
12. Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 1448,1449 (S.D. III. 1985),
aff'd, 823 F.2d 1031 (7th Cir.), aft'd, 108 S. Ct. 1877 (1988); see 29 U.S.C. § 185.
[Vol. 1989
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would undermine the mutually agreed upon procedures provided for in that
[collective bargaining] agreement."13
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, while addressing like
cases in tandem, affirmed the district court decision. After an extensive
discussion, the court held that "[a]ll of the plaintiff's claims are claims for
breaches of the just cause provisions of the collective bargaining agreements
and thus are preempted . . . [W]e note that federal labor law favors the
use of the grievance and arbitration mechanisms that are contained in a
collective bargaining agreement." 4 In order to clear up conflicts between
the circuits, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.15
In a relatively brief, unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court reversed
the Seventh Circuit's decision. The Court held that state court actions for
wrongful discharge are preempted only to the extent they interpret the
collective bargaining agreement and that such interpretation did not occur
in the case at bar. 6 The Court's discussion focused specifically on the
common law tort of retaliatory discharge as recognized by Illinois courts.17
The Court reasoned that each of the elements of the plaintiff's case involved
factual inquiries, and that neither inquiry required the interpretation of the
collective bargaining agreement." It is important to note, however, the
Court's statement to the effect that state legislatures could create a wrongful
discharge remedy that would turn on the interpretation of the collective
bargaining agreement which would be preempted by Section 301.19
13. Lingle, 618 F.Supp. at 1449.
14. Lingle, 823 F.2d at 1051.
15. Lingle, 108 S. Ct. at 1879-80.
16. Id. at 1878. The Supreme Court initially introduced this principle of law in Allis-
Chalmers v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985).
17. Id. at 1881-82. Under Illinois common law, the plaintiff must show:
to show retaliatory discharge, the plaintiff must set forth sufficient facts from which it can
be inferred that (1) he was discharged or threatened with discharge and (2) the employer's
motivation in discharging or threatening to discharge him was to deter him from exercising
his rights under the Act or to interfere with the exercise of those rights.
Id at 1882 (quoting Horton v. Miller Chemical Co., 776 F.2d 1351, 1356 (7th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1122 (1986) (summarizing Illinois state court decisions)).
18. Id.
19. See id. at 1882 n.7.
19891
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III. FEDERAL PREEMPTION AND THE TORT OF WRONGFUL DISCHARGE
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Supremacy Clause of Article VI
of the United States Constitution' as giving Congress power to supersede
the policies of federalism and preempt state law."t However, Congress has
never attempted to exercise total dominion and control in the field of labor
legislation.' The Ninth Circuit recently noted that, "[l]abor preemption is
a complex and confused area of the law. Preemption is a matter of
congressional intent, but the labor statutes provide little or no guidance as
to what aspects of state law Congress intended to preempt."23
The scope of Congressional power to preempt is determined through
legislative intent and judicial interpretation. Since Congress failed to detail
to what extent it intended Section 30124 of the LMRA to preempt state law,
its scope has been left to judicial interpretation.
A. Judicial Interpretation of Section 301.
In Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills,' the Supreme Court, in its initial
consideration of Section 301 of the LMRA, held that substantive law dealing
with Section 301 litigation "[i]s federal law, which the courts must fashion
from the policy of our national labor laws."26 Recently, the Court has
interpreted Section 301 to be a "congressional mandate to federal courts to
[develop] a body of federal common law to be used to address disputes
arising out of labor contracts." 7
20. "'his Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof... shall be the supreme Law of the Land .... " U.S. CONsT. art. VI § 2.
21. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 16-17 (1824).
22. See Allis-Chalmers v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 208 (1985). To elaborate further on this
concept, "[w]e cannot declare preempted all concerns ... between employees, employers and
unions; obviously, much is left to the state." Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S.
274, 289 (1971).
23. See Olguin v. Inspiration Consol. Copper Co., 740 F.2d 1468, 1473 (9th Cir. 1984).
24. Section 301 of the LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACr (LMRA) provides in relevant
part:
Suits for violations of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing
employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any
such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having
jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard
to the citizenship of the parties.
29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982).
25. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
26. Id. at 456.
27. Lueck, 471 U.S. at 209.
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The premier analysis of the preemptive effect of Section 301 came in
the landmark decision of Local 174, International Brotherhood of Teamsters
v. Lucas Flour Co.28 In an effort to prevent the inevitable patchwork of
state court interpretations of Section 301 which would, "strike at the very
core of federal labor policy,"2 the Court held:
the dimensions of Section 301 require the conclusion that . . .
[c]omprehensiveness is inherent in the process by which the law is to
be formulated under the mandate of Lincoln Mills, requiring issues
raised in suits of a kind covered by § 301 to be decided according to the
precepts of federal labor policy.'
In holding that a state court action alleging a violation of a collective
bargaining agreement is preempted, the Court stated:
The possibility that individual contract terms might have different
meanings under state and federal law would inevitably exert a disruptive
influence upon the negotiation and administration of collective
bargaining agreements . . . Once the collective bargain was made, the
possibility of conflicting substantive interpretation under competing legal
systems would tend to stimulate and prolong disputes as to its
interpretation. a
The rule of law set out in Lucas Flour, that federal law shall always
prevail when contract interpretation is at issue, has remained well en-
trenched over the years.32 Recently, however, a question of federal
preemption by Section 301 has arisen when a state tort action for wrongful
discharge is filed by an employee covered by a collective bargaining
agreement.
28. 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
29. Id. at 104.
30. Id. at 103.
31. Id. at 103-104.
32. The Court in Lueck reiterated this point and stated: "[wjhen resolution of a state-law
claim is substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the
parties in a labor contract, that claim must either be treated as a § 301 claim .... or dismissed
as preempted by federal labor-contract law." Lueck, 471 U.S. at 220 (citations omitted).
19891
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B. The Tort of Wrongful Discharge
The emergence of the cause of action for wrongful or unjust discharge
found its genesis with the at-will employee who was discharged contrary to
proclaimed public policy. Under American common law, the employer-
employee relationship could be severed by either party, absent a contractual
arrangement providing otherwise.33 In the late 19th century, the New York
Court of Appeals noted that an at-will employee hired for an indefinite
period of time could be discharged for "good cause, no cause, or even bad
cause."3 Even today, it has been estimated that nearly two-thirds of the
American work force is under the employment at-will doctrine.
The question of federal preemption does not even enter the picture
until the plaintiff, who is protected by a collective bargaining agreement and
has exhausted her arbitration remedies, seeks remedial relief in state court.
The fundamental question in determining whether a claim is preempted is
how far removed the state claim is from the interests of the NLRA. While
the general rule that federal law prevails over state law when the two
conflict still remains a bastion of constitutional law, courts have recognized
several exceptions, thus allowing state claims to be adjudicated.
The most obvious and least debated exception is the "Congressional
intent" exception.3 In certain circumstances, Congress did not intend federal
law to overrun the policies of federalism. 37 For example, in Malone v. White
Motor Corp.,' the Supreme Court held that Congress did not intend state
laws regarding employee pension plans to be preempted by federal law.
39
Moreover, other legislative acts specifically state in their enabling language
or legislative history that state law shall not be preempted. The Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act ° and state Worker's Compensation laws are
prime examples.
33. Coopage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915). See also Heinsz, Judicial Review of Labor
Arbitration Awards: The Enterprise Wheel Goes Around and Around, 52 Mo. L. REv. 243, 288
(1987).
34. See Martin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 148 N.Y. 117, 42 N.E. 416 (1895).
35. See Peck, Unjust Discharges from Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 OHIO
ST. LJ. 1, 8 (1979). Out of the total U.S. labor force, only 12% to 13% are estimated to be
organized workers and covered by a collective bargaining agreement. Blocklyn, Labor Relations:
Toward an Uncertain Future, PERSONNEL, Oct. 1988, at 18.
36. See Comment, NLRA Preemption of State Wrongful Discharge Claims, 34 HASINGS LJ.
635, 650 (1982-83).
37. See, eg., Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497 (1978).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 512.
40. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-75 (1976).
[Vol. 1989
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While the courts have developed other exceptions,41 the most dynamic
exception and the focus of this note is the "public policy" exception. It
should be noted that courts traditionally had difficulty in defining exactly
what was the state's proclaimed public policy. The court's job can be made
less difficult when state legislatures specifically enunciate their intent when
adopting or amending state wrongful discharge statutes.
1. The Public Policy Exception
Until the landmark and trendsetting decision of Petermann v. Local 396
International Brotherhood of Teamsters," an employee could be terminated
for any reason, even if he chose not to carry out a certain task because it
was unsafe or illegal. In Petermann, the plaintiff was under a union
employment contract with no specific duration except as long as his work
was satisfactory. Petermann was subpoenaed to testify before a California
State Legislature Committee.43 An agent of the defendant union allegedly
instructed Petermann to make false and untrue statements to the commit-
tee.' Petermann chose to testify truthfully and was discharged the following
day.45 In the subsequent wrongful discharge action, the court held that
while employment contracts with no specific duration are terminable at will,
such terminations are subject to "considerations of public policy.""
The California Court of Appeals struggled with a problem which has
troubled courts since this decision: what is "public policy?" The court in an
earlier decision noted that "[tihe term 'public policy' is inherently not
subject to a precise definition . . . [public policy is] that principle of law
which holds that no citizen can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be
injurious to the public or against public good. . . ."4 The Petermann
decision is continually cited as recognizing a cause of action for unjust
discharge for reasons contrary to public policy.'
41. See infra notes 51 to 56 and accompanying text.
42. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).
43. Id. at 187, 344 P.2d at 26.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 188, 344 P.2d at 27.
47. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, 41 Cal. 2d 567, 575, 261 P.2d 721, 726
(1953).
48. See Weeks, NLRA Preemption of State Common Law Wrongfid Discharge Claims: The
Bhopal Brigade Goes Home, 13 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 607, 615 (1986).
19891
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Over one hundred years of this country's jurisprudence is marked by the
universal principle that an employee can be discharged or quit at will.4 9
However, when the public policy of the state is involved, courts follow the
Petermann doctrine and allow an independent cause of action for wrongful
discharge. The controversy this note will now explore pertains to those
individuals who are allegedly wrongfully discharged and covered by a
collective bargaining agreement which includes just cause provisions and
mandatory grievance and arbitration procedures.
IV. CASE HISTORY OF THE CONTROVERSY
At least twenty-nine states have judicially recognized some form of
wrongful discharge.50  Generally, courts have allowed wrongful discharge
actions under five theories:1 (1) violation of a statute;52 (2) denial of due
process to a public employee;5 3 (3) violation of an expressed or implied-
in-fact cojptract; 4 (4) an independent action for racial discrimination;5 and
(5) employee's termination violates the public policy of the state. 6
By far the most dynamic category of wrongful discharge is the last of
the five aforementioned categories, a violation of public policy. Employ-
ment terminations contrary to public policy where courts have allowed
recoveries include practices in violation of federal anti-trust laws," illegal
price fixing of gasoline," refusing to alter pollution control reports,5 9
49. Id. at 620.
50. See Heinsz, supra note 33, at 288 n.2.
51. See generally Comment, supra note 36, at 635 n.1.
52. See, e.g., Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 450-451, 168 Cal.
Rptr. 722, 726 (1980); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
53. See, e.g., Wilkerson v. City of Placentia, 118 Cal. App. 3d 435, 173 Cal. Rptr. 294
(1981).
54. See, e.g., Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W. 2d 622 (Minn. 1983); Pugh v.
See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal Rptr. 917 (1981).
55. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
56. See, eg., Petermann, 174 Cal. App. 2d at 184, 344 P. 2d at 25; Tammeny v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 27 Cal. App. 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980).
57. See, e.g., Perry v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 537 F. Supp. 1387 (S.D. Ind. 1982).
58. See, eg., Tammeny, 27 Cal. App. 2d at 167, 610 P.2d at 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 839;
McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 1111 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
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reporting health department infractions to health authorities,60 reporting to
jury duty,"' or acting as an election poll official.'
The United States Supreme Court correctly observed in Lingle that a
conflict between the circuits existed regarding the issue of federal preemp-
tion of state wrongful discharge actions.63  Nearly every federal circuit
addressing a Section 301 preemption question cites the 1984 Supreme Court
decision of Allis-Chalmers v. Lueck,64 which stands for the modern day
preemption doctrine. In Lueck, the plaintiff was entitled to disability
benefits under an insurance policy provided for in the collective bargaining
agreement.6 The agreement also provided for a mandatory four-step
grievance procedure.65 Lueck alleged his employer harassed him about a
disability claim he had submitted and hindered his receipt of benefits.
67
Instead of complying with the mandated grievance procedures, Lueck filed
suit in state court claiming bad faith handling of his insurance claim.' The
district court held that the state claim was preempted under Section 301.
60. See, e.g., Garibaldi v. Lucky Foods Stores, Inc., 726 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1099 (1985).
61. See e.g, Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975).
62. See, eg, Kouff v. Bethleham Alameda Shipyard, 90 Cal. App. 2d 322, 202 P.2d 1059
(1949).
63. Lingle, 108 S. Ct. at 1879-80.
64. 471 U.S. 202 (1985). See, eg, Malia v. RCA Corp., 794 F.2d 909 (3rd Cir. 1986), cert
denied, 107 S. Ct. 3210 (1987) (held preempted plaintiff's action alleging breach of contract
after plaintiff was promoted and promised his old job back if he desired and when he requested
such move he was denied the position); Kirby v. Allegheny Beverage Corp., 811 F.2d 253 (4th
Cir. 1987) (former employee's invasion of privacy claim against his employer was held to be in
lieu of a wrongful discharge claim and thus preempted); Bache v. American Tel. & Tel. Co.,
840 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1988) (former employee's failure to exhaust grievance process and make
sufficient showing of unfair representation claim held preempted); Dougherty v. Parsec, Inc., 824
F.2d 1477 (6th Cir. 1987) (plaintiff's claims alleging wrongful discharge because he filed
complaint with OSHA against railroad was held preempted); Leu v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co.,
820 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1987) (former employee's suit alleging fraud and misrepresentation in
connection with failure to pay medical expenses held preempted); Hillard v. Dobelman, 774 F.2d
886 (8th Cir. 1985) (ex-employee's claim of tortious interference of contract held preempted);
Vincent v. Trend W. Technical Corp., 828 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1987) (former employee's claim
for wrongful discharge held preempted); Edwards v. Western Mfg, 641 F. Supp. 616 (D. Kan.
1986) (former employee's action for retaliatory discharge preempted); Darden v. United States
Steel Co., 830 F.2d 1116 (11th Cir. 1987) (employees filed separate action seeking damages for
breach of contract, false representation, conspiracy and conversion held preempted).
65. Lueck, 471 U.S. at 204.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 205.
68. Id. at 206.
9
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The Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed, but the Wisconsin Supreme
Court reversed.'
The United States Supreme Court reversed and held the state claim was
not an independent tort claim "[blecause the right asserted not only derived
from the contract, but is defined by the contractual obligation of good faith,
any attempt to assess liability here inevitably will involve contract interpreta-
tion."' The Court further expressed concern that the most destructive
aspect of the Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision was that essentially the
same suit would be brought in state court without first exhausting the
grievance procedures set out in the collective bargaining agreement.71 Thus,
the doctrine of Lueck holds that under Section 301 claims, the arbitrator,
not the state court, has the responsibility of interpreting the labor contract. 2
A. Contract Based Wrongful Discharge Actions
The courts regularly deny a wrongful discharge action which requires the
court to interpret the collective bargaining agreement. In Bale v. General
Telephone Co.,73 the Ninth Circuit held that an action brought by former
employees for tortious misrepresentation made at the time of hiring was
preempted by Section 301. 7' The plaintiffs alleged they were hired with the
understanding that they would be "temporary" employees for six months and
at the end of that period would be promoted to "regular" employee status.7"
Plaintiffs were held as temporary employees past the six month period which
directly conflicted with terms of the collective bargaining agreement.76
Citing Lueck, the court expanded upon that doctrine by noting that not only
contract claims but tort claims which would "frustrate the federal labor-
contract scheme established by § 301" should be preempted.77 Moreover,
69. Id. at 206-7.
70. Id. at 218.
71. Id. at 219.
72. Id. at 220.
73. 795 F.2d 775 (9th Cir. 1986).
74. Id. at 779.
75. Id. at 777.
76. Id. The provision of the collective bargain agreement which plaintiff claimed was
violated held a temporary employee as "a person who is employed for a continuous work period,
not to exceed six months, when additional work of any nature requires a temporary augmented
force or where replacements are required for regular employees who are absent." Id (quoting
Agreement Art. VI § 14).
77. Lueck, 471 U.S. at 212.
[Vol. 1989
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the court noted that the full scope of Section 301 preemption purview was
to be determined on a case-by-case basis.78
The Ninth Circuit again applied the Lueck doctrine in Scott v.
Machinists Automotive Trades District Lodge No. 190. 9 The plaintiff in this
case was discharged after fourteen years of service for using profanity toward
his foreman.' The union filed a grievance on his behalf.81 The day before
the arbitration hearing, Scott's employer, Safeway, offered reinstatement and
back pay.u Scott refused the offer. Arbitration was rescheduled, and a
settlement was reached on Scott's behalf by the union which included
reinstatement and back pay.u Settlement checks were sent, but Scott
refused to accept them.84 Instead, Scott filed suits in state and federal court
alleging wrongful discharge and intentional infliction of emotional distress.'
Reiterating the Lueck doctrine that "[w]hen [the] resolution of a state law
claim is substantially dependant upon analysis of the terms of an agreement
between the parties to a labor contract, that claim must either be treated
as a § 301 claim ... or dismissed as preempted by federal labor-contract
law," the court held preemption was proper.'
The Supreme Court reaffirmed the Lueck doctrine in International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Hechler8 Hechler, the plaintiff, was
employed by Florida Power and Light Company as an electrical apprentice.
Hechler was later assigned to a job which she claimed required skills beyond
her training. 9 Thereafter, Hechler was injured when she came in contact
with some highly energized components." Two years after the accident,
Hechler brought suit against her representative union in state court for
failure to provide a safe workplace pursuant to her union contract. 91 The
union removed the case to federal district court and argued that the duties
78. Bale, 795 F.2d at 779 (citing Lueck, 471 U.S. at 212).
79. 815 F.2d 1281 (9th Cir. 1987).





85. Id. at 1282.
86. Id. at 1283 (citing Lueck, 471 U.S. at 220).
87. 481 U.S. 851 (1987).
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which the plaintiff spoke of were part of the collective bargaining agree-
ment, thus subject to Section 301 preemption.'
In holding that the plaintiff's claim was preempted, the Court noted that
in order to determine the union's tort liability, a court would have to
determine whether the collective bargaining agreement imposed a duty of
care on the union to provide the plaintiff with a safe workplace, and also
would need to look to the agreement to determine the scope of such duty
if it existed. 93 As a result, the court concluded that a determination of the
claim for liability would require outright interpretation of the contract and
was, therefore, preempted.
B. Public Policy Based Wrongful Discharge Action
Courts are more open to granting a cause of action for wrongful
discharge based on a violation of state public policy. The Ninth Circuit, in
its influential decision in Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, Inc.,94 recognized
the difference between contract based and public policy based wrongful
discharge actions. In Garibaldi, a teamster truck driver for Lucky Food
Stores was allegedly wrongfully discharged. 95  Garibaldi noticed that a
shipment of milk he was scheduled to deliver was spoiled and reported this
fact to his supervisor who instructed him to disregard it and deliver the milk
as scheduled.9 Instead, Garibaldi notified the California public health
authorities who in turn condemned the milk.' Thereafter, Garibaldi's
employment was terminated.Y
Garibaldi filed a grievance pursuant to the collective bargaining
agreement. 99 The arbitrator found he was discharged for just cause." A
year after filing his grievance, Garibaldi filed suit in the California Superior
Court for wrongful discharge and intentional infliction of emotional
distress."' He based his wrongful discharge count on the theory that his
termination was in direct conflict with California public health policy.' 2
92. Id. at 854.
93. Id. at 859.
94. 726 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1984) cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1099 (1985).







102. Id. at 1369.
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Lucky Food removed to federal district court pursuant to Section 301, and
the district court maintained jurisdiction over both claims. t" The district
court granted Lucky Food's motion to dismiss the first count for wrongful
discharge and remanded the intentional infliction of emotional distress to
the state court. 14
In reaching the decision that Garibaldi's "whistle blowing" actions were
commendable and his wrongful discharge claim was worthy of state court
consideration, the Ninth Circuit, like the Supreme Court in Lingle, looked
specifically to the state wrongful discharge statute which states, "[a]n action
for wrongful discharge in California exists if the termination violates (1)
public policy. .. .to The statute is to be applied across the board to all
workers.' 6
In making the distinction that Garibaldi's claim did not allege a
violation of the collective bargain agreement, but rather, public policy, the
court held:
A claim grounded in state law for wrongful termination for public policy
reasons poses no significant threat to the collective bargaining process;
it does not alter the economic relationship between employer and
employee. The remedy is in tort, distinct from any contractual remedy
an employee might have under the collective bargaining contract. It
furthers the state's interest in protecting the general public--an interest
which transcends the employment relationship. 0 7
Immediately after its decision in Garibaldi, the Ninth Circuit was faced
with a similar legal question in Olguin v. Inspiration Consolidated Coal Co."°
However, on this occasion, the court came to a different conclusion. In this
case, the plaintiff was employed as a welder for seven and one half years by
the defendant and was covered by a collective bargaining agreement with
a "just cause" provision.1°9 After being disciplined by his employer on four
103. Id. at 1369.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1373; see also Tammeny, 27 Cal. 3d at 167, 610 P.2d at 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr.
at 839 (the court established a public policy exception for an employee who was discharged
after he refused to fix gas prices in violation of federal law).
106. Garibaldi, 726 F.2d at 1373. The Ninth Circuit also discredited Lucky Foods'
argument that the California wrongful discharge law does not apply to union employees. The
court said in dictum, "[wie see nothing in the cases addressing wrongful termination in violation
of public policy that suggests [this] distinction." Id at 1373 n.9.
107. Id. at 1375.
108. 740 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1986).
109. Id. at 1470.
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separate occasions, the plaintiff was discharged. The plaintiff filed actions
with the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) and the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) alleging that he was discharged for filing
a safety complaint, and that his discharge was an unfair labor practice.1 °
Both claims were denied.' The plaintiff filed yet another complaint with
the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission which eventually
awarded him $1000.111 Not satisfied, the plaintiff filed suit in Arizona state
court, claiming wrongful discharge.11 3 The defendant removed to federal
court where the district court granted summary judgment in its favor and
ruled the claims were subject to federal law."4 Because the plaintiff failed
to follow grievance procedures provided for in the collective bargaining
agreement, the court dismissed his complaint.'
In distinguishing Olguin from Garibaldi, the Ninth Circuit noted that
Olguin's complaint alleged a violation of the Federal Mine and Safety Act,
a federal law, and made no mention of any state statutes.116 In holding that
Olguin specifically invoked federal law, thus preempting his state claim, the
court noted, "Arizona has little interest in enforcing federal law, even if that
federal law is incorporated ... in the state's general public policy."" 7 The
Ninth Circuit essentially stated what the Supreme Court said in Lingle: In
order for a state tort claim to withstand preemption, the claimant must cite
and rely on a state statute which allows a cause of action independent of
the collective bargaining agreement.
Statutory interpretation was the Third Circuit's basis for holding that
the plaintiff's action for wrongful discharge was not preempted in Herring
v. Price Macaroni."' The plaintiff in this case was allegedly discharged for
filing a workers' compensation claim in violation of a New Jersey statute." 9






116. Id. at 1475.
117. Id.
118. 799 F.2d 120 (3rd Cir. 1986); see also Judson Steel Corp. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals
Bd., 22 Cal. 3d 658, 568 P.2d 564, 150 Cal. Rptr. 250 (1978); Vaughn v. Pacific Northwest Bell
Tel. Co., 289 Or. 73, 611 P.2d 281 (1980).
119. Herring, 799 F.2d at 121 (construing NJ. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-39.1 (Supp. 1986)).
The statute provides in relevant part: "It shall be unlawful for any employer or his duly
authorized agent to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against an employee as to
his employment because such employee has claimed workmen's compensation benefits from such
employer. ... " NJ. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-39.1.
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The plaintiff was covered by a collective bargaining agreement. Because the
statute did not create a private cause of action, the plaintiff additionally
relied on a recent New Jersey state court decision which recognized a
common law action for wrongful discharge which was contrary to public
policy 120
The district court held the claim was preempted on two grounds. First,
the district court predicted that the New Jersey Supreme Court would hold
that employees covered by collective bargaining agreements with "just cause"
provisions would not "enjoy a common law right of action.""' Second, the
court held that Herring was additionally precluded because he failed to
exhaust his extra-judicial remedies. t22 In reversing, the Third Circuit held
that since state workers' compensation laws are rooted in state law, the New
Jersey Supreme Court would extend the right to a private cause of action
for individuals covered by a collective bargaining agreement.
t23
In considering a similar action dealing with a worker's compensation
claim, the Second Circuit in Baldracchi v. Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Division12 4
ruled that not every question regarding a collective bargaining agreement is
preempted by Section 301.125 Prior to her discharge, Baldracchi was
employed by defendant and was covered by a collective bargaining agree-
ment."z  Baldracchi filed suit in the Superior Court for the State of
Connecticut alleging wrongful discharge for filing a workers' compensation
claim. Baldracchi argued the discharge was in violation of Connecticut
which prohibits such actions and authorizes civil remedies for violations.
12 7
120. Herring, 799 F.2d at 122; (interpreting Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 NJ.
58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 124. The court argues that a worker's compensation rights are based in state
law through the state legislature, as opposed to being rooted in the collective bargaining
agreement, and as such the claim for wrongful discharge for filing a workers compensation
claims is not preempted by federal law. Id. at 124 n.2.
124. 814 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1987).
125. Id. at 106; see also Lueck, 471 U.S. at 211.
126. Baldracchi, 814 F.2d at 103.
127. Id. (construing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-290a (1986)). The statute provides:
(a) No employee who is subject to the provisions of [the Connecticut Workers'
Compensation law] shall discharge, or cause to be discharged, or in any manner
discriminate against an employee because the employee has filed a claim for workers'
compensation benefits or otherwise exercised the rights afforded him pursuant to the
provisions of this chapter.
(b) Any employee who is so discharged or discriminated against may either (1) Bring a
civil action in the Superior Court . . . for the reinstatement of his previous job, payment
of back wages and reestablishment of employee benefits to which he would have otherwise
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In reversing the district court, the Second Circuit contrasted the tort in
Lueck with the tort in Baldracchi, concluding that Baldracchi's claim did not
turn on the interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement.' Pratt
& Whitney argued that reference to the labor contract was necessary for
Baldracchi to make a prima facie case, thus subjecting her claim to
preemption."2  The Second Circuit disagreed and pointed out that the
Connecticut legislature has addressed this problem and specifically prohibits
such a defense. t30 Furthermore, the statute provides that such rights cannot
be bargained away. In concluding Baldracchi's claim was not preempted, the
court made the observation that state statutes such as the Connecticut law
are directed at all employees, not only to those who are not subject to a
labor contract.'
V. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
The past thirty years have witnessed rather dramatic changes in the area
of federal labor and employment law. The long standing, well-entrenched
rule that federal law preempts similar state statutes when the two are in
conflict has arguably seen its structural base threatened through judicial
activism. The full repercussions have yet to be determined. As a result, the
number of state law claims asserting damages under a theory of wrongful
discharge have increased dramatically."' What was for so many years a life
without legal recourse for the at-will employee has turned into an area of
law which recognizes an ever expanding network of "public policy"
exceptions. Some commentators have noted that the judicial activism
responsible for this change has "[n]arrow[ed] the traditional gulf of benefits
been entitled if he had not been discriminated against or discharged and any other
damages caused by such discrimination or discharge. The court may also award puniwive
dwgw . . . or, (2) file a complaint with the chairman of the workers' compensation
commission alleging violations of the provision of subsection (a) of this section... The
commissioner may award the employee reinstatement of his previous job, payment of back
wages and reestablishment of employee benefits to which he otherwise would have been
eligible is he had not been . . . discharged.
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-290a (emphasis added).
128. Baldracchi, 814 F.2d at 105.
129. Id.
130. Id. (construing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-290). This statute provides that "[nlo contract,
expressed or implied, no rule, regulation of other device shall in any manner relieve any
employer, in whole or in part, of any obligation created by this chapter, except as herein set
forth."
131. Baldracchi, 814 F.2d at 107.
132. See Comment, supra note 36, at 635; see also Peck, supra note 35, at 1.
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and protections. . . ." which exists between union and non-union workers, 3
producing a seeming socio-economic balancing of the scales. However,
difficult questions arise now that the Supreme Court has so emphatically
spoken. Has the Court allowed the scales to once again hang unbalanced
by allowing an employee who is already afforded employment protections
through a collective bargaining agreement to seek damages in state court?
What will be the practical effects on business, on the negotiation of
collective bargaining agreements, and on state legislatures across the
country?
Under the Supreme Court's decision in Lingle, a union employee who
was wrongfully discharged could receive back pay and reinstatement from an
industrial arbitration board and could feasibly recover a second time on the
same set of facts in a state wrongful discharge action.13 However, it is
important to note the Court's efforts to preserve the sanctity of arbitration
in the grievance process. The Court notes that the interpretation of the
collective bargaining agreement remains the sole responsibility of the labor
arbitrator. 35
The relative impact of the Supreme Court's decision can either be
accentuated or nullified by state legislatures. The sole power of drafting,
amending and enabling wrongful discharge statutes lies with the governing
bodies of the states.
State governments are faced with four main possibilities. First, a statute
could be adopted completely in line with the Supreme Court's decision in
Lingle. Such a statute would permit an employee who has exhausted her
arbitration remedies, successfully or otherwise, to file a separate wrongful
discharge action in state court, provided the lawsuit does not require
interpretation of the employment contract.'3 A statute of this nature would
subject an employer to double damages. The employer could be liable for
back pay and reinstatement pursuant to the arbitration hearing and also be
liable in state court. Conversely, an employee, having lost in arbitration is
133. See Comment, supra note 36, at 636.
134. See Lingle, 108 S. Ct. at 1883.
135. Id. at 1884. The Court further notes, a state claim can remain independent while
referring to the employment contract for adjudication purposes.
[Als a general proposition, a state law claim may depend for its resolution upon both the
interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement and a separate state law analysis that
does not turn on the agreement. In such a case, federal law would govern the
interpretation of the agreement, but the separate state law analysis would not be thereby
preempted.
Id. at 1885 n.12.
136. The Court noted that referring to the collective bargaining agreement for rate of pay
and benefits for purposes of determining damages would not be considered contract
interpretation. Id. at 1885 n.12.
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afforded another opportunity to be compensated for her alleged wrongful
discharge. The costs of this option to business are obvious. However,
should a state legislature be concerned about costs to business when the
owner is being punished for a wrongful act? This issue will undoubtedly be
discussed in full during state legislative committee hearings and floor
debates.
Second, a state could nullify the effects of Lingle by drafting legislation
or amending an existing statute to require any state wrongful discharge
action to fall under a collective bargaining agreement. Adopting a statute
of this nature would preempt all state actions for union members covered
by a collective bargaining agreement and work to narrow the gap between
union and non-union workers. The rights of those workers employed
without the benefit of an employment contract would not be affected.
Those workers covered by a collective bargaining agreement would be
allowed a single remedy; arbitration in accordance with the collective
bargaining agreement's grievance procedure.
Third, a state could take a more moderate approach. Should an
employee covered by a union contract exhaust her arbitration remedies fully
and not be compensated, a state wrongful discharge action could be allowed.
However, should the employee be victorious in the arbitration proceedings,
she would be precluded from filing an independent state action. This
approach would prevent remedial "double dipping" while not totally
excluding union employees from state remedies. It is important to note that
under this option the state legislature has the ability to define certain types
of actions or events which the legislature has determined are so contrary to
the state's public policy that an action would stand even though the
employee was successful in arbitration. Thus, a state legislature could
specifically allow for remedial "double dipping" to prevent certain types of
terminations which contradict enunciated state public policies.
Fourth, states can preserve and enhance the sanctity of arbitration and
mediation. Those states which have adopted a state Uniform Arbitration
Act have the option to allow an independent state claim to stand, but
stipulate the claim must be submitted to arbitration, not the judicial system.
The practical effects of this type of statute are twofold. First, the state
would be expanding upon its already proclaimed policy favoring arbitration
proceedings. Second, by diverting lawsuits to a mediation arena, less strain
is put on an already over burdened judicial calendar.
The political landscape of each individual state's bodypolitic will
determine which, if any, of the aforementioned alternatives should be or will
be adopted. Unions have traditionally supported the Democratic Party. In
return, the Democratic Party has ushered through Congress and numerous
state legislative bodies organized labor's legislative agenda. Presently, a
majority of the state legislatures and state executives are in democratic
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hands.137 Under such a political analysis, one could conclude that wrongful
discharge statutes favorable to the union employee will be drafted.
However, the strength of unions in the collective bargaining process has
been challenged. 138 If the percentage of eligible workers actually covered by
a collective bargaining agreement continues, the bargaining power of unions
will continue to wane.
39
If the latter trend holds true, not only will there be a higher probability
that state wrongful discharge legislation will be pro-business--that is, anti-
remedial "double dipping"--but the content of collective bargaining
agreements could begin to change. If management is placed in a position
where a statute allows a worker to collect twice, the opportunity exists to
negotiate an agreement which would allow for an arbitration hearing with
appropriate remedies, yet preclude that employee from bringing a second
action in state court. In drafting a contract in such a manner, state courts
would be compelled to interpret the collective bargaining agreement which,
under Lingle, would preclude a state action.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef,
Inc. may not have been a landmark; however, the ramifications are
potentially complex and important. The Court accomplished what it set out
to do: articulate a rule of law which would shore up the disparity of judicial
interpretations existing in the various federal circuits. The rule is simple
and succinct, but the implications are yet to be determined. Both organized
labor and business will play an important role in determining the exact
ramifications. In states where wrongful discharge statutes do not exist,
advocates on both sides of this issue have their work cut out for them.
Efforts to get the legislative process rolling require influence, preparation,
and money. The same holds true for preventing legislation from being
enacted. Moreover, there will undoubtedly be efforts from both labor and
business to amend existing statutes to benefit each group's respective
137. After the 1988 elections, 28 state executive offices were held by Democrats and 22
by Republicans; 69 state chambers were controlled by Democrats and 28 by Republicans.
Fourteen states have Democrats controlling both the state legislature and governor's mansion
and the Republicans control both branches of government in four states. NATIONAL JOURNAL,
Nov. 22, 1988, at 2883.
138. See generally Blocklyn, supra note 35, at 18; Cullen, INTERNATIONAL LABOR REVIEW,
Vol. 24, No. 3, May-June 1985, at 229.
139. Brocklyn notes, "[ojut of a total U.S. labor force between 122 and 127 million
workers, between 15 and 17 million are unionized, a mere 12% to 13% of that estimated total.
If the AFL-CIO's failure to organize the unorganized continues, unions will themselves continue
to lose credibility in the public eye." Blocklyn, supra note 35, at 18.
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interests. While there is no significant difference between lobbying efforts
required for legislative enactment and legislative amendment, legislative rules
allow those attempting to amend legislation more room to operate.
It is important to note that legislation which punishes employers for
terminating an employee who acted in a responsible manner contrary to her
employer's desires or acted according to her rights could be politically
difficult to oppose, especially in an election year. Conversely, a valid
argument exists for not allowing an employee to collect twice for the same
wrong; an act which is precluded in civil litigation by the doctrines of res
judicata and collateral estoppel and by double jeopardy in criminal trials.
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